Philosophy In Hard Times

1873

V
Philosophy in Hard Times[1]

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The Philosopher

Part 1. Medicinal morality.[2]
Part 2. Excessive thinking is ineffectual. Kleist.[3]
Part 3. The effect of philosophy, then and now.
Part 4. Popular philosophy (Plutarch, Montaigne).
Part 5. Schopenhauer.
Part 6. The priestly squabble between optimism and pessimism.
Part 7. Primitive times.
Part 8. Christianity and morality. Why [are they] not as strong as they used to be?
Part 9. Young teachers and educators as philosophers.
Part 10. Veneration of ethical naturalism.

Enormous operations: but they amount to nothing.

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[1]The full German title is *Gedanken zu der Betrachtungen: Die Philosophie in Bedrängniss.* Of course this title was first assigned to this collection of notes by the editors of *GOA*, X. The first half of the title indicates that this material was intended for one of the projected "Untimely Meditations." The word *Bedrängniss* in the second part of the title means "distress," "affliction," or "tribulation," and I have translated it in this way when it appears in the notes themselves. However "Philosophy in Hard Times" seems to me to catch the provocative flavor of this title better than the more literal "Philosophy in Distress." As usual my translation is based upon the text printed in *MA*, VII, but I have reintroduced the convenient numbers assigned to the notes by the editors of *GOA*, X. (*PB* begins with number 35; numbers 1-34 in *GOA*, X are unused notes for *UBa* and *UBb*.)

[2]*Die medizinische Moral.* I.e. morality as a cure.

[3]Heinrich von Kleist (1777-1811), important German poet, dramatist, and novelist who committed suicide. The meaning of this reference is explained in *UBc*, 3, where Nietzsche mentions Kleist's despair concerning the consequences of Kantian philosophy.

The Tribulations of Philosophy

A. The demands made upon philosophy in the present time of need. Greater than ever.

B. The attack on philosophy greater than ever.

C. And philosophers weaker than ever.

1. What the philosopher has been at various times.

2. What he would have to be in our age.

3. Portrait of the timely philosopher.

4. The reason why he is unable to accomplish that which, according to number 2, he would have to accomplish: because there is no firm culture. The philosopher as hermit. Schopenhauer shows how nature makes an effort; nevertheless, it is insufficient.

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To begin with: Symptoms of a decay of education[4] are everywhere, a complete extirpation: haste, the subsiding waters of religion, national conflicts, science fragmenting and disintegrating, the contemptible cash and pleasure economy of the educated classes, their lack of love and grandeur. It is clearer and clearer to me that the learned classes are in every respect a part of this movement. They become more thoughtless and loveless with every day. Everything, art as well as science, serves the approaching barbarity. Where should we turn? The great deluge of barbarity is at the door: Since we really have nothing whatsoever with which to defend ourselves and are all a part of this movement. What is to be done?[5]

The attempt to warn the actually present powers, to join with them, and to subdue those strata from which the danger of barbarism threatens while there is still time. But every alliance with the "educated" is to be rejected. That is the greatest enemy, for it hinders the physician and would disavow the disease.

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We must seriously consider whether or not there still exist any foundations at all for the development of a culture. Is philosophy of any use as such a foundation? But it has *never* served this purpose.

My confidence in religion is boundlessly slight: after an enormous inundation one can see the waters subsiding.

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[4]*Bildung*. See above, *P*, n. 79.

[5]Compare this striking paragraph with the similar description of the age in *UBc*, 4. Both passages are strongly reminiscent of some of Nietzsche's later descriptions of contemporary nihilism, e.g. those with which *WM* begins.

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Toward a Description of the Present Age

I note a weariness *in regard to religion*: people have finally grown tired of and exhausted by the weighty symbols. All possible forms of Christian life have been tried: the strictest and the most lax, the most harmless and thoughtless and the most reflective. It is time to discover something new, or else one must fall back into the same old cycle over and over again. Of course it is difficult to emerge from the whirlpool after it has spun us around for a few thousand years.[6] Even mockery, cynicism, and hostility toward Christianity have run their course. What one sees is an icefield in warming weather: the ice is everywhere broken—dirty, lusterless, dotted with puddles of water, dangerous. A considerate and seemly abstention seems to me to be the only appropriate attitude: I thereby honor religion, though it is dying. Our job is to assuage and soothe, as in the case of the grievously, hopelessly ill. All we must protest against are bad, thoughtless, and bungling physicians (which is what most learned persons are). Christianity will very soon be ripe for critical history, i.e. for dissection.[7]

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[6]Cf. *WM,* 30: "The time is coming when we will have to *pay* for having been *Christians* for two thousand years."

[7]It is instructive to compare the attitude toward Christianity evidenced in this passage and in these notebooks generally with Nietzsche's much better-known anti-Christian polemics. For the fact that Nietzsche's hostility towards Christianity *increased* over the years suggests that his eventual, very negative assessment of Christianity is based upon a more profound analysis of religion in general and Christianity in particular, rather than being in any sense a vestige of adolescent rebellion. The attitude toward religion and Christianity which Nietzsche expresses in his early published and unpublished writings is far more ambiguous than his later view. First of all, Nietzsche's early evaluations of Christianity as "one of the purest manifestations of the impulse toward culture and especially toward the ever renewed production of the saint" (*UBc,*6) were very much influenced by his rather superficial Schopenhauerianism. But apart from this, he values religion as a means of mastering the knowledge drive and facilitating cultural unity (*P,* 53) and as a source of criteria for measuring the world according to human ideals (*WWK,* 199). Christianity, in particular, is praised for the greater nobility of its moral ideas compared to those of antiquity (*UBc,* 3). However, Nietzsche was always aware that Christianity and religion were losing their power in the modern world and that an attempt to revivify religion was doomed to failure (*PB,* 37-8)—that, as he later put it, "God is dead." Finally, there are passages in the early writings which show that Nietzsche had already begun to augment his appreciation of religion and Christianity with an understanding of the profoundly world-denying character of the religious "valuation" of the world (e.g. *WP,* 158-61).

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Wisdom independent of any knowledge of science.

The lower classes of unlearned men are now our only hope. The learned and cultivated classes must be abandoned, and along with them, the priests, who understand only these classes and who are themselves members of them. Men who still know what need is will also be aware of what wisdom can be for them. The greatest danger is the contamination of the unlearned classes by the yeast of modern education.

If a Luther were to appear now, he would rebel against the disgusting mentality of the propertied classes, against their stupidity and thoughtlessness: for they have not the least suspicion of the danger.[8]

Where should we seek the people?

Education grows worse every day because of increased haste.

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It is all over with us if the working classes ever discover that they now can easily surpass us by means of education and virtue. But if this does not happen then all the more is it all over with us.

41

Education contradicts a man's nature.

What would happen if one allowed this nature to evolve by itself, that is to say, amid purely accidental influences? It would still be shaped,[9] but it would be shaped and formed *accidentally,* in conformity with the unlimited irrationality of nature: one fine specimen out of countlessly many. Innumerable seeds are usually destroyed, either by the discord of inner forces, or because of external influences. They are ruined either by inner discord (while the [discordant inner] forces grow stronger) or from without, because of insufficient oxygen, etc.[10]

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Pericles speaks of the Athenian festivals, of beautiful and costly domestic furnishings, the daily sight of which chases away gloom. We Germans suffer greatly from this gloomy disposition. From the influx of

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[8]In other words, if Luther were to appear now he would do precisely what Nietzsche is doing in the "Untimely Meditations"!

[9]*gebildet.* The word translated "education" here is, of course, *Bildung* (= "shaping" or "forming").

[10]The contrast between education and natural purposelessness occurs frequently in Nietzsche's early writings, especially in *UBc* where the image of the ruined seeds recurs (*UBc,* 7). This theme is closely related to his more general discussion of naturalness as something to be *attained.* See above, *P,* 104.

beauty and greatness, Schiller hoped for a secondary effect in the realm of moral elevation—a moral by-product of aesthetic elevation.[11] Conversely, Wagner hopes that the moral powers of the Germans will one day finally be turned to the realm of art and will demand seriousness and dignity in this realm as well. He takes art as strictly and as seriously as possible: by doing so he eventually hopes to experience its cheering effect.[12] Our situation is quite upside-down and unnatural: we place the greatest difficulties in the way of those men who want to cheer us up by means of art. Thus we demand moral brilliancy and greatness of character from them. Since the education of the most talented artists is made so difficult that they have to squander all their strength in this struggle,[13] we non-artists have on the other hand become very lax in the moral demands that we make upon ourselves. Considerations of comfort govern the principles and views of life. Thus by taking life easy, we lose the genuine need for art. When it is the case, as it was among the Athenians, that life is continually filled with duty, challenge, enterprise, and difficulty, then one knows how to esteem and to crave art, festivity, and education in general: i.e. one craves them in order to be cheered by them. And thus the moral weakness of the Germans is the chief reason why they have no culture. To be sure, they are extraordinary workers; everything is hurried. This hereditary diligence looks almost like a force of nature—in which their moral weakness proclaims itself!

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Our age prefers vigorously one-sided people, because they at least continue to give evidence of vitality—and there must be strength before something can be cultivated.[14] If there is weakness then the effort is directed to conservation at any price; in any case nothing will be created in which one could take delight. The case is comparable to that of the consumptive who gasps for life and must always think of health, i.e. preservation. If an age has many natures of this sort, it will end up esteeming strength, even when it is coarse and hostile.

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[11] This account of the moral effect of aesthetic elevation is provided by Schiller in his *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man* (1795).

[12] See *U'Bc*, 2 for a discussion of the way in which a work of art can "cheer us" and the difference between the falsely optimistic cheer of, for example, David Strauss and the genuine cheer associated with authors like Montaigne and Schopenhauer. The latter type of cheer always represents a victory over difficulty and has obvious parallels with Nietzsche's view of tragedy.

[13] Nietzsche makes the same indictment of the German culture of his times—viz., that it places stumbling blocks in the way of higher creative natures—in *U'Ba*, 4 and *ZB*, 4.

[14] *gebildet.*

44

One who becomes acquainted with the morality of antiquity will be surprised by the number of things which are now treated medically but which were in those days taken to be matters of morality. He will be amazed at how many disturbances of the soul, of the head, which were then turned over to philosophers, are now turned over to doctors—in particular, he will be amazed at the way in which alkalies or narcotics now serve to soothe the nerves. The ancients were much more moderate and more deliberately so in daily life. They knew how to abstain from and to deny themselves many things in order not to lose control over themselves. In every case their sayings concerning morality were based on the living example of those who had lived according to their sayings. I do not know what sort of distant and rare things modern moral philosophers are talking about: they take man to be a marvelous, spiritualistic being and seem to consider it indecent to deal with him in such a nakedly Greek manner and to speak of his many necessary, though base, needs. This bashfulness has gone so far that one might believe that modern man's body is merely an illusion.[15] I believe that the vegetarians, with their prescription to eat less and more simply, are of more use than all the new moral systems taken together: a little exaggeration here is of no importance. There is no doubt that the future educators of mankind will also prescribe a stricter diet. One hopes to make modern men healthy by means of air, sun, habitation, travel, etc.—including medical stimuli and toxins. But nothing which would be difficult for man seems to be ordered any longer. The maxim seems to be: be healthy and ill in an agreeable and comfortable manner. Yet it is just this incessant lack of moderation in *small* matters, this lack of self-discipline, which finally becomes evident as universal haste and *impotentia*.[16]

45

I am thinking of Diogenes' first night:[17] all the philosophy of antiquity was directed toward simplicity in living and taught a certain frugality—

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[15]*nur noch einen Scheinleib.* The emphasis upon the philosophical importance of recognizing man as a *bodily* being is very characteristic of Nietzsche, but receives classical statement in *Z*, I, 3-4. This is one of the most *enduring* of Schopenhauer's influences upon Nietzsche's thought.

[16]"impotence."

[17]Diogenes of Sinope (423?-323 B.C.), the celebrated cynic philosopher. Presumably, Nietzsche is referring to the story of Diogenes' "conversion" to a simple, "philosophical" mode of living. According to the version related by Plutarch (*Moralia*, 77-8), there was an all-night public celebration in Athens and Diogenes was huddled in a corner feeling resentful for not being included in the feasting,

the most important remedy against all thoughts of social revolution. In this respect the few philosophical vegetarians have accomplished more for man than all the more recent philosophies. And so long as philosophers fail to muster the courage to seek a totally transformed regimen and to exhibit it by their own example, then they are of no consequence.[18]

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The Tribulations of Philosophy

External: natural science, history (example: instinct become concept).
Internal: the courage to live a philosophy has broken down.

The other sciences (natural science, history) are only capable of explaining, not of commanding. And when they do command, they are only capable of referring to *utility*.[19] But every religion and every philosophy has in it somewhere a sublime *abnormality*, a conspicuous uselessness.[20] Is that all there is to it? Just like poetry, which is a type of nonsense.

A person's happiness is dependent upon the fact that somewhere there exists for him a truth which is *not debatable*: a crude example is the well-being of one's family considered as the highest motive for action; a more refined example is faith in the church, etc. If anything is said against it he will not listen at all.

Is the philosopher supposed to be the *brakeshoe* in the midst of this enormous agitation? Is he still able to be this?

The *mistrust* which strict scientific investigators have of every *deductive* system, *vide*. Bagehot.[21]

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when he observed a mouse eating the crumbs of bread left from his own meal. When he realized that his crumbs were a feast for the mouse he rebuked himself for his earlier feelings and embarked upon his well-known project of simplifying his life in every possible way. (The same story is recounted by Aelian, in *Varia Historia*, XIII, 26.)

[18]Nietzsche attached considerable importance to questions of diet and health and was constantly making personal experiments with new regimens. The remarks about vegeterianism in this and the previous sections are reminiscent of some of the later views of Ludwig Feuerbach. (See also *M*, 119 and 203, and *EH*, II.) The call for a totally transformed regimen should be understood in the light of Nietzsche's interpretation of culture as an "improved *physis*." (See below, *PB*, 80.)

[19]*Nutzen*.

[20]Re. the "conspicuous uselessness" of philosophy, see *PW* and *UBc*, 7.

[21]Walter Bagehot (1826-77), English economist and writer. He was a champion of "scientific observation" of men, politics, and history: an approach pro-

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There is a trick of holding oneself aloof from things solely by means of the words and names which one has conferred upon them: a foreign word frequently makes something which we are very well and intimately acquainted with foreign to us. When I say "wisdom" and "love of wisdom," I certainly feel something more familiar and powerful than when I say "philosophy." But as was said, the trick is sometimes precisely not to let things draw too near; for there often lies so much that is shameful in the familiar words. For who would not be ashamed to call himself a "wise man" or even merely "one who is becoming wise"! But a "philosopher"? This easily passes anyone's lips—nearly as easily as everyone uses the title "doctor," without ever thinking of the arrogant confession which this title contains: the confession that one is a "teacher."[22] Let us then assume that [the use of] the foreign word "philosopher" is prompted by shame and modesty? Or is it perhaps true that there exists no "love of truth" at all, and that the foreign designation—as in the case of the word "doctor"—is only intended to hide the lack of content, the emptiness of the concept? It is sometimes extraordinarily difficult to demonstrate something's presence, because it is so amalgamated, translated, and concealed, so diluted and weakened, whereas the names remain constant and are seducers as well. Is what we call "philosophy" today actually the love of wisdom? Does wisdom have any true friends at all today? Let us fearlessly replace the word "philosophy" with "love of wisdom": then it will become clear whether they are the same thing.

48

The philosopher is a philosopher first only for himself, and then for others. It is not possible to be a philosopher completely for oneself. For as a human being a person is related to other human beings, and if he is a philosopher, he must be a philosopher in this relationship. I mean that even if a philosopher strictly separates himself from others, even if he is a hermit, he thereby provides others with a lesson and an example and is

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moted and exemplified in his widely translated and very influential book *Physics and Politics* (1869). Nietzsche quotes twice from this book in *UBc* (sections 3 and 8). The passage quoted in *UBc*, 8 is undoubtedly the one which prompts the present reference to Bagehot.

[22]Nietzsche is, of course, referring to the custom of calling academic Ph.D's "doctor," rather than "teacher." It may seem surprising to us that he would consider the former the more modest appelation, but this is because of the extremely high regard which Nietzsche had for the genuine teacher. In *WP*, 46 he says that "the highest and most exacting calling [is] that of the teacher and shaper of mankind." See also *ZB*, 3 and all of *UBc*.

a philosopher for them. Let him conduct himself however he pleases, as a philosopher he still has a side which faces other men.[23]

The philosopher's product is his *life* (which occupies the most important position, *before* his *works*). His life is his work of art, and every work of art is first turned toward the artist and then toward other men.

What effects does the philosopher have upon those who are not philosophers and upon other philosophers?

The state, society, religions, etc. could all ask: "What has philosophy done for us? What can it do for us today?" The same question could also be asked by culture.[24]

In general: the question concerning the cultural effects of philosophy.

Redefinition of culture: a single temperament and key composed of many originally hostile forces, which now enable a melody to be played.[25]

49

The most important feature of wisdom is that it keeps men from being ruled by the moment. Therefore, it is not "newsworthy."[26] The aim of wisdom is to enable man to face all the blows of fate with equal firmness, to arm him for all times. It is not very national.

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Every philosophy must be able to do what I demand: it must be able to concentrate a man.[27] But no philosophy can do this now.

Two tasks: to defend the new against the old, and to connect the old with the new.

51

Philosophers have always strived for the soul's repose. Now [one

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[23]This helps to explain Zarathustra's decision to "go down" among men at the end of section one of the preface to *Z*.

[24]*So auch die Kultur.* This might also mean "The same question could also be asked concerning culture"; however, the next sentence seems to favor the proposed reading.

[25]Re. Nietzsche's understanding of culture as stylistic unity cf. *P*, n. 35. The word "temperament" in this definit:on of culture is employed in the *musical* sense: the system of adjusting the intervals between the tones of an instrument of fixed intonation; tuning.

[26]*zeitungsgemäss.* This is Nietzsche's coinage: a pun on *Zeitung* ("newspaper") and *zeitgemäss* ("timely").

[27]*einen Menschen konzentrieren.* I.e. philosophy should give a man a focus which will provide him with direction and unity. Cf. *P*, 30.

strives] for unconditional unrest: so that the person is completely absorbed by his office, his trade. No philosopher will tolerate the tyranny of the press: Goethe allowed only weekly papers and pamphlets to be published.

52

Alas this brief span of time! We at least want to deal with it grandly and freely. We should not become slaves to the giver on account of such a small gift! It is most peculiar how constrained men's ideas and imaginations are: they never truly perceive life as a whole. They fear the words and opinions of their neighbors. Alas, only two more generations and then no one will any longer have those opinions which rule today and which seek to enslave you.

53

What effect has philosophy now had *upon philosophers*? They live just like all the other scholars, even like the politicians. Schopenhauer is of course an exception. They are not distinguished by a special manner of living.[28] They teach for the money. [For example:] the five thinkers of the *Augsburger Allgemeinen Zeitung*.[29] Consider the lives of their highest specimens, Kant and Schopenhauer: are these the lives of wise men? It remains [merely] science. They relate to their work as performers—thus Schopenhauer's lust for success. It is *comfortable* to be a philosopher, for no one makes any demands of philosophers. They occupy themselves with public *apices*.[30] Socrates would insist that one haul philosophy back down to man's level. Either there is no popular philosophy [today], or else it is of a wholly bad kind. Today's philosophers manifest all the vices of the age, above all its haste, and they rush into writing. They are not ashamed to teach, even when they are very young.

54

Many things only become durable when they have become weak. Until then they are threatened by the danger of a sudden and violent collapse. Health in old age becomes ever healthier. Christianity, for example, is now so diligently defended and will continue to be defended for a long time to come because it has become the most comfortable religion. Now it almost has the prospect of permanence, for it has won over to its side the most durable things in the world: human laziness and indolence.

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[28]*Sie zeichen sich durch keine Sitten aus.*

[29]See below, *PB,* 64.

[30]The Plural of the Latin *apex.* Here it means "highest ornaments or honors," "crowns."

Similarly, philosophy is most highly esteemed and has the greatest number of champions precisely now, because now it no longer pesters people (indeed, many are supported by it), and no one hesitates to open his mouth and say whatever comes into his head. Vigorous, strong things run the danger of suddenly being ruined, cracked, and struck by lightning. The full-blooded man is seized by apoplexy. Particularly since becoming an historical discipline, philosophy has assured its own harmlessness and thereby its permanence.[31]

55

To turn *philosophy* purely into a science (after the manner of Trendelenburg)[32] means to throw in the towel.[33]

56

Philosophy's strongest tendency [has brought it to the point where it] is on the verge of being transformed into a relativistic system, approximately similar to πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος.[34] With this, philosophy is finished; for nothing is more insufferable than such border patrolmen who know nothing except, "Here no further!" "One must not go there!" "This person has lost his way!" "We know nothing with absolute certainty!" etc. This is totally barren soil. Is philosophy finished then? When he was a very small boy, the Emperor Augustus was annoyed by the croaking of frogs at a villa. He commanded them to be silent, and, as Suetonius relates, they are said to have been quiet from then on.[35]

57

If contemporary philosophers were to dream up a *polis*, it would certainly be no *Platonopolis,* but rather an *Apragopolis* (city of loafers).[36]

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[31]This brings to mind Nietzsche's deadly accurate suggested epitaph for academic philosophy: "It never hurt anybody." For Nietzsche's critique of the reduction of philosophy to the study of its own history, see *UBc,* 8 (which is also the source of this epitaph).

[32]Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg (1802-72), Berlin philosopher and author of several important historical studies of Aristotle, Spinoza, and Kant. Today he is probably best remembered as the author of a penetrating logical critique of Hegel.

[33]*die Flinte in's Korn werfen.* Literally: "to throw the musket in the corn."

[34]"Man is the measure of all things": a famous Sophistic maxim attributed to Protagoras.

[35]Suetonius was a Roman historian of the first century A.D. The story of Aususstus and the frogs may be found in his *The Twelve Caesars,* II, 94.

[36]*Polis* is the Greek word for city (or city-state); hence, *Platonopolis* refers to the city sketched by Plato in the *Republic.*

58

The inclination toward mysticism among our philosophers is at the same time a flight from tangible ethics. In the mystical beyond there are no more demands, neither are there geniuses of goodness and transcendent sympathy. If imputability is shifted to the essence [i.e. the mystical beyond], then the ancient moral systems are meaningless.

Philosophers wish to flee from science, but it pursues them. One can see where their weakness lies: they no longer lead the way, because philosophy itself is merely science and is gradually turning into nothing but professional border patrolling.[37]

59

Sympathy for primitive conditions is certainly the favorite amusement of the age. What nonsense that a theory of evolution can be taught as if it were a religion! One is delighted that there is nothing fixed, eternal, and inviolable.

60

I hate that overleaping of this world which occurs when one condemns this world wholesale. Art and religion grow out of this. Oh, I understand this flight up and away into the repose of the One.[38]

How they lack love, these philosophers who are always thinking only of the chosen ones and have so little faith in their own wisdom! For like the sun, wisdom must shine for everyone, and a faint ray must be able to plunge down into the humblest soul.

A *possession* promised to man! Philosophy and religion as a longing for *property*.

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[37] *Grenzwächterschaft.* What Nietzsche is alluding to here is the idea, sometimes thought to have originated with Kant's Critical Philosophy, that there is no distinctively philosophical knowledge, that the function of philosophy is merely to see that every seeker of knowledge plays by the "rules of the game"—which are usually thought to be the rules of mathematical natural science and formal logic. If anything, this conception of philosophy is more wide-spread today than it was in the 1870's.

[38] In fact, Nietzsche was only just beginning to "understand this flight into the repose of the One." He had, for example, not yet come to grasp the essential contribution of *revenge* to this flight.

61

I am unable to imagine Schopenhauer at a university. The students would run away from him and he himself would run away from his colleagues.

62

Schopenhauer is simple and honest. He seeks no catch phrases nor fig leaves; rather, he says to a world which finds itself stunted by dishonesty: "Behold, this is what man is!" What power all of his conceptions have: the will (which connects us with Augustine, Pascal, and the Indians), denial, the theory of the genius of the species! There is no agitation in his presentation, but only the clear depth of a lake which is calm, or upon which the waves surge gently while the sun shines above. He is coarse, like Luther. He is the strictest model of a German prose writer up until now. No one else has taken language--and the duty that it imposes—so seriously. One can, *e contrario,*[39] see how much dignity and greatness Schopenhauer has by observing his imitator, Hartmann (who is really his *opponent*).[40] His greatness is extraordinary: he has looked afresh into the heart of existence, without any scholarly diversions and without tiresomely dwelling upon and becoming entangled in philosophical scholasticism. The only attraction of studying the quasi-philosophers[41] who follow him is to see how they land at once in a situation in which scholarly pros and cons, brooding, and disputation are permitted, but nothing else is—where, above all, one is not permitted *to live*. Schopenhauer demolishes secularization, just as he demolishes the barbarizing power of science. He awakens the most enormous need, just as Socrates awakened a similar need. It has been forgotten what religion was, as well as the meaning that art had for life. Schopenhauer stands in contradiction to everything which now passes for culture; Plato stood in contradiction to everything that formerly *was* culture in Greece. He was ahead of his time.[42]

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[39]"on the contrary."

[40]Eduard von Hartmann (1842-1906), extremely popular German philosopher during the late nineteenth century. Hartmann claimed to have synthesized Hegelian and Schopenhauerian metaphysics in his own system, presented in his best known book, *Die Philosophie des Unbewussten* (1869).

[41]*Viertelsphilosophen,* literally: "one-quarter-philosophers."

[42]In other words, Schopenhauer's opposition to culture was justified in a way that Plato's was not: for the culture of ancient Greece was a genuine culture, whereas the culture of nineteenth century Germany is a sham culture (see *UBa*). This remark sheds light upon the complex problem of Nietzsche's attitude toward Plato (just as the immediately preceding comparison between Socrates and Schopenhauer sheds light upon Nietzsche's attitude toward Socrates).

63

The word "philosophy," as it is applied to German scholars and authors, has recently caused me difficulty. It seems to me out of place. I wish that from now on one would avoid this word and speak straightforwardly and forcefully of nothing but "*intellectual housekeeping*."[43]

Nevertheless, I will tell how I hit upon this notion.

64

I have the presumption to speak to the "nation of thinkers"[44] on the subject of German intellectual housekeeping (in order to avoid saying "philosophy"). The foreigner will ask: "Where do these people [of this 'nation of thinkers'] dwell?" There, where dwell those five thinkers who were recently brought to our attention in an extraordinarily public place as the embodiment of present-day German philosophy: *Ulrici, Frohschammer, Huber, Carrière,* and *Fichte*.[45] True, it is easy to say something good concerning the last-named, for even Büchner,[46] that wicked he-man, has done so: "According to the younger Fichte all men have a guiding spirit from the day of their birth—only Herr Fichte has none."

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[43]*Denkwirtschaft.* This is Nietzsche's coinage and might also be translated "intellectual economy."

[44]In former times "nation of thinkers" was a common sobriquet applied to Germany. Nietzsche often called attention to the fact that Germany had, in his view, ceased to be a "nation of thinkers" at the same time that it had become a "nation" (after the Franco-Prussian war). Cf. *MAMb,* 319.

[45]Johann Nepomuk Huber (1830-79), theologian and professor of philosophy at Munich. Huber was a leader of the "Old Catholic" party, an opponent of mechanistic world views and defender of the substantiality and freedom of spirit.

Immanuel Hermann von Fichte (1796-1879), son of the illustrious Johann Gottlieb Fichte. The "younger Fichte" expounded a highly eclectic idealist philosophy, with special emphasis upon theological issues and individual personality.

Jakob Froschammer (1821-93), priest and professor of philosophy at Munich. Froschammer claimed to have subordinated faith and revelation to idealist metaphysics.

Hermann Ulrici (1806-84), professor of philosophy at Halle. Ulrici was an idealist who criticized Hegel and proposed to erect his own metaphysics upon the foundation of natural science.

Moritz Carrière (1817-95), professor of philosophy at Munich. Carrière's philosophy, derived from Fichte and Hegel, but with a special emphasis upon aesthetic issues and individual personality, enjoyed considerable popular success during his own lifetime.

[46]Ludwig Büchner (1824-96), Darmstadt physician and author of *Kraft und Stoff* (1855). Büchner was one of the first and most influential exponents of modern philosophical materialism in Germany.

But this fanatic friend of matter would also concede to me that something phosphoresces in the remaining four men which does not do so in the younger Fichte. Thus one of the five thinkers lacks spirit, while the other four phosphoresce. Taken in a lump, they all philosophize, or rather, to speak quite plainly, they all engage in intellectual housekeeping. Yet foreigners are referred to these five so that they may recognize that we Germans are still the "nation of thinkers." With good reason Eduard von Hartmann was not included with the others; for Hartmann really possesses something that the younger Fichte would have liked. Indeed, by virtue of this something he has led the "nation of these five thinkers" around by the nose in a most unmannerly manner. As a result it appears that he no longer believes in the nation of thinkers and—what is worse—he apparently doesn't even believe any longer in the five intellectual housekeepers. But no one is pronounced blessed today unless he has faith in these five, and this is why Hartmann's name is missing from the list of the celebrated names of the German *Reich*: for he possesses spirit, and the *Reich* now belongs only to the poor in spirit.[47]

65

Is *Herr Ulrici* wise? Does he even linger in the train of wisdom as one of its admirers? No, sadly no, and I can't help it, after all, if he is not a wise man. Of course it would be so elevating to know that we Germans have a wise man in Halle, a wise man in Munich, etc. And it is with particular reluctance that we let Carrère slip away: Carrière, the discoverer of real-idealism and wooden iron.[48] If he had only been a little wiser, how happy we would have been to have accepted him completely. For it is a disgrace that the nation does not have even *one* wise man, but merely five intellectual housekeepers. And it is a disgrace that Eduard von Hartmann can reveal what he knows: that philosophers are at the moment lacking in Germany.

66

Result for our time: nothing comes of this situation. Why indeed? *They are not philosophers for themselves.*

"Physician heal thyself!" is what we must shout to them.

67

One must also note that a great deal of philosophy has already been inherited: indeed, men are almost saturated with it. Doesn't every conversation, every popular book, and every science contain within itself an

[47] A pun on Luke 6: 21. In German, the "kingdom of heaven" is also the *Reich.*

[48] In German this is a proverbial name for something contradictory.

applied philosophy? How countless as well are the actions which reveal that modern man has been bequeathed an infinite amount of philosophy. Even the men of Homer's time showed evidence of this inherited philosophy. I do not think that mankind would cease to philosophize, even if all the professorial chairs were permitted to go unfilled. What hasn't theology engulfed! I mean—ethics in its entirety! A world-view like the Christian one must gradually absorb all other ethics; it must combat them; it must win them over; and it must come to terms with them—indeed, if it is stronger and more persistent than they are, it must destroy them.

68

What are the effects of philosophy which one perceives among the philosophers' pupils, that is, among the *educated* people? We lack what is the best topic of conversation: refined ethics. *Rameau's Nephew.*[49]

Hypertrophy of the aesthetic viewpoint for considering greatness and life.[50]

69

The case is the same with the sciences as it is with trees: one can only cling to the stout trunk and the lower boughs and not to the most distant branches and extremities. Otherwise, one will fall, and in doing so one will, as a rule, break the lower boughs as well. The case is the same with philosophy: woe to the young who would cling to its *apices*.[51]

70

What reflections, what intimacy with the soul there was during the time of Diderot and Friedrich the Great! Even *Minna von Barnhelm*,[52] which is thoroughly grounded in the language of French society, is too refined for us today. We are raw naturalists.

I wish that someone would show the extent to which we are becoming perfect Jesuits in our glorification of ethical naturalism. Our love of what is natural is the love of aestheticians, not the love of moral philosophers.

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[49]*Rameau's Nephew* is a famous work by Diderot, the French encyclopedist and *philosophe* (1713-84). It was translated into German by Goethe in 1805, and its wit and irony exercized a great influence upon German thought and letters in the early nineteenth century.

[50]This is one of Nietzsche's earliest indications of his growing dissatisfaction with the "artists' metaphysics" of *GT*—a dissatisfaction which only became explicit and public in Part IV of *MAMa*.

[51]"summits," "extremities."

[52]A hugely popular drama by Lessing (1767). *Minna von Barnhelm* is often cited as the first modern German stage comedy.

But there are no moral philosophers. One only has to recall Schleiermacher.[53]

71

The lack of acquaintance with Plutarch: Montaigne is better known. He is the most influential author (according to Smiles).[54] Would a new Plutarch even be possible? We all live according to a naturalistic ethic without style, and we all too easily consider the figures of antiquity declamatory.

Christianity demonstrated better form, but most [of its followers] have relapsed. It is now so difficult to return to the simplicity of the ancients.[55]

The Jesuits weakened and softened the demands of Christianity in order further to assert its power. Protestantism commenced with the enlightenment of the *adiaphora*[56] on a large scale.

Gratian[57] displays a wisdom and prudence in the experiences of life to which nothing today is comparable. We are undoubtedly the microscopists of the real. Our novelists (Balzac, Dickens) know how to observe, yet no one knows how to demand and to explain.

72

What is lacking is ethical *renown*; the ability to recognize it is definitely lacking. The "theory of force" strenuously opposes this assertion. For example, let someone say "Hegel is a poor stylist," and another will reply, "but he is so rich in original and down to earth expressions." But this only concerns the material. The stylist does not reveal himself by having

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[53]Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768-1834), philosopher and professor of theology at Berlin. Schleiermacher is among the most influential modern protestant theologians and is always mentioned by Nietzsche with contempt. For further discussion of what Nietzsche means by "ethical naturalism" in the present context, see *UBc,* 2.

[54]Samuel Smiles (1812-1904), popular Scottish biographer and author of the widely translated *Self-Help.* Montaigne and Plutarch were, of course, always two of Nietzsche's own favorite authors.

[55]This thought is developed more fully in *UBc,* 2: "Through the elevation of its ideals Christianity surpassed the moral systems of antiquity and the naturalness which prevailed in such systems to such an extent that one became apathetic toward and disgusted by this naturalness. Afterwards however, when one still recognized the better and the higher, but was no longer capable of attaining them, one was no longer able to return to the good and the high, that is to the virtue of antiquity, no matter how much one wished to be able to do so."

[56]A word derived from the Greek for "not different," "not individual." The *adiaphora* are those who are undistinguished in any way.

[57]Flavius Gratianus Augustus (359-83), emperor of Rome, 375-383.

a beautiful piece of marble, but rather by the manner in which he carves it. The case is the same regarding matters of ethics.

73

In contrast with the ancients, *Montaigne* is also an ethical naturalist—though he is a boundlessly rich and thoughtful one. We are thoughtless naturalists, with full awareness of the fact.

74

Defectively developed *logic*! It is stunted by historical study. Even Zöllner complains: Praise of Spir and the English.[58]

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[58]C.F. Zöllner (1836-82), one of the founders of astrophysics and an important and controversial writer on a variety of scientific subjects. Zöllner scandalized his professional colleagues with his book *Über die Natur der Kometen,* in which he argued that sensation extends throughout all of matter, and that the primary sensations are those of pleasure and displeasure. Zöllner also criticized his colleagues in the natural sciences for a failure to read and understand the works of their predecessors, for their unnecessary reduplication of experiments and compilation of useless data, for their failure to grow in logical acumen, and for their "popularizations" of scientific ideas. He also called attention to the importance of pleasure and displeasure as motives within science itself.

Afrikan Spir (1837-90), a Russian philosopher who emigrated to Germany in 1867, defended a theory of knowledge strongly influenced by the English empiricists (whom he often praises for their clear and logical way of doing philosophy). In *Denken und Wirklichkeit* (1873), Spir argued that knowledge is not obtainable, that the world is an illusion, and that "reality" is constituted from sensations and feelings. He tried to develop his entire system from nothing but immediately given sensations and the principle of identity.

Anni Anders has disucssed Nietzsche's acquaintance with the writings of Zöllner and Spir in great detail (Schlechta/Anders, pp. 118-27). Nietzsche first read Zöllner's book in November of 1872 and reread it several times thereafter. The influence of Zöllner may be detected in Nietzsche's critique of "scientific laborers" (e.g. in *UBb*) and, more specifically, in some of the remarks about the nature of matter and the sensations of pleasure and displeasure which can be found in *P*.

The influence of Spir (whose book Nietzsche first read immediately after it was first published—at a time when Spir was a quite unknown figure—and many times thereafter) was more important. Anders thinks that Spir remained the epistemologist whom Nietzsche valued most highly, even after he had moved beyond many of Spir's views, and attributes many of Nietzche's advances in his theory of knowledge between the winter of 1872 and the summer of 1873 (i.e. between *P* and *WL*) to the influence of his reading of Spir. For example, the new stress on the relevance of the problem of language to the problem of truth shows Spir's influence on Nietzsche's thinking.

75

Professors of philosophy no longer practice skills, not even the art of debate. As it is taught, logic is quite useless. But after all, the teachers are much too young to be anything more than scientific trainees. How could they be expected to educate anyone toward wisdom?

76

Virtue is an outmoded word. One only has to think of your secondary school teachers when they try to play the role of ethical educators![59]

77

There are two maxims concerning education: First, one should quickly get to know an individual's strength and thereafter direct everything toward developing it at the expense of all the remaining secondary strengths.[60] Education thus becomes the guiding of that [primary] strength. Second, one should bring *all* existing strengths into play and should place them in harmonious relation with each other: thus the secondary strengths—those that are in need of transfusion—should be strengthened, and those that are strong should be weakened. Now where is one supposed to find a criterion [for choosing between these two maxims]?[61] The happiness of the individual? The profit which he renders the community? One-sided[62] individuals are more useful; harmonious ones are happier. At once the question arises anew: Should a great community, a state, or a people especially cultivate one-sided strength or many strengths? In the case of a state which chooses to cultivate one strength, a one-sided development of the individual will be tolerated only when the particular[62] qualities are included within the goal *of the state*, i.e. such a state will only educate a *portion* of the individuals in accordance with their particular strength. In the case of the others it will no longer look for strengths and weaknesses, but rather will look to

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[59]These critical remarks about the "teachers" of the day and how they differ from wise men and ethical educators were developed by Nietzsche at great length in the lectures on modern education which he gave in the spring of 1872 (*ZB*) and are repeated in *UBc*.

[60]Cf. *MAMa*, 242, where Nietzsche distinguishes three matters to which educators must pay attention: first, how much energy has been inherited; second, how new energy might be aroused; third, how the individual can adapt to the manifold claims of culture without destroying his own personality.

[61]In *UBc*, 2 Nietzsche repeats these two maxims and concludes that they are not really contraries at all. They are, instead, found to be complementary: the first is the demand that man shall have a center; the second, that he shall have a periphery.

[62]*partiellen*.

see that the [state's] particular quality [i.e. the quality favored by the state]—be it originally ever so weak—is in any event *developed*. If what the state desires [for itself] is a harmony, it can still accomplish this in two ways: either by means of the harmonious development of all the individuals or by means of a harmony of one-sidedly developed individuals. In this latter case, the state wishes to produce a single temperament from powerful and openly antagonistic forces. This means that the state must restrain the one-sided exclusivity of those who are strong: it must restrain them from hostility toward one another and from actual destruction. It must unite them all through a common *goal* (church, national prosperity, etc.).

Athens is an example of the latter type of state; *Sparta* is an example of the former type. The first type is much more difficult and artificial. It is most exposed to degeneration. It requires a supervising *physician*.

In our age everything is confused and unclear. The modern state becomes more and more like Sparta. It might happen that the greatest and noblest forces will dry up and die away owing to atrophy and transfusion. For I observe that the sciences and philosophy itself are preparing the way for precisely such an occurrence. They are no longer bulwarks, because they are no longer allowed to have their own *goal,* i.e. because no commonwealth embodies their essence in its goal. Thus what is needed is the foundation of a *cultural state*, in opposition to the false ones which now go by this name and which would serve as a sort of *refugium*[63] of culture.

78

In the state the individual's happiness is subordinated to the general welfare: what does this mean? Not that the minorities are utilized for the welfare of the majorities, but rather that individuals are subordinated to the welfare of the *highest individuals*, to the welfare of the highest specimens. The highest individuals are the creative persons—be they morally the best, or else useful in some larger sense. Thus they are the purest models and are the improvers of mankind. The goal of the commonwealth is not the existence of a state at any price, but rather its goal is for the highest specimens to be able to live and create within it. This is also the goal that underlies the foundation of states, except that they often had a false opinion concerning who the highest specimens were: often conquerors, dynasties, etc. If the state's existence is no longer to be preserved in such a way that great individuals can live within it, what will then arise is the terrifying state filled with misery, the pirate state in which the *strongest* individuals take the place of the *best*. It is not the

[63]"refuge," or "place of refuge."

state's task that the greatest possible number of people live well and ethically within it; numbers do not matter. Instead, the task of the state is to make it generally possible for one to live well and beautifully therein. Its task is to furnish the basis of a *culture*. In short, a nobler humanity is the goal of the state. Its goal lies outside of itself. The state is a means.[64]

What is lacking today is anything which can unite all the one-sided forces: and so we observe that everything is hostile to everything else and that all the noble forces are engaged in a mutually destructive war of annihilation. Philosophy is an example of this: it *destroys,* because there is nothing to keep it within boundaries. The philosopher has become a being who is *harmful to the community*. He annihilates happiness, virtue, culture, and finally himself.

Formerly, in the role of *cultural physician,* philosophy had to be in alliance with the cohesive forces.

79

Concise writing. Winckelmann[65] said that it is difficult to write concisely and not a project for everyone. For one can less readily be taken at his word in a fuller type of writing. He who wrote to someone "I did not have enough time to make this letter briefer" understood what the concise style of writing demands.

Without any pathos. Almost no periods. No questions. Few images. Everything very terse. Peaceful. No irony. No climax. Stress upon the logical element, yet very concise.[66]

What is wisdom? In opposition to science. (Preface)

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[64]Taken together, this and the previous section provide one of the more succinct statements of Nietzsche's view of politics and the state. Points particularly worthy of emphasis are: (1) the interpretation of the state as a means toward cultural and aesthetic ends; (2) the utopian, almost Platonic character of Nietzsche's idea of an "aristocracy of creative geniuses"; (3) the relation of the "great man" to nature and to other men—his existence justifies theirs. Most of these ideas are developed at greater length in the very important unpublished essay of 1871 on the Greek state (*GS*). They are hinted at in *UBc,* 6, but only receive explicit public presentation in *MAMa,* 439.

[65]Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1717-68), the distinguished and influential German archeologist and historian of ancient art.

[66]These notes show how deliberately Nietzsche sought to shake off the Wagnerian excesses of his first public prose style and to cultivate a style and a voice of his own—one more appropriate to the new way of thinking being worked out in the notebooks. The ideal described in this last passage is brilliantly realized in the series of five books published between *UBd* and *Z*.

Is there any striving for wisdom today? No! (Main Section)
Is a striving toward wisdom needed? Is it a necessity?
No. But it will perhaps soon be a necessity once again. When? Description. (Epilog)

80

The Tribulations of Philosophy

A. *The misery of the age. The demands upon philosophers.*

1. Haste.
2. No building for eternity (modern houses).[67]
3. Religion which has become stale.
4. Medicinal morality. Naturalism.
5. Weakening of logic (by means of history and natural science).
6. Lack of educators.
7. The uselessness and dangerous *complexity* of requirements and duties.
8. Volcanic ground.

B. *The attacks on philosophy.*

1. The mistrust of the more rigorous methods.
2. History destroys the validity of the systems.
3. The church has a monopoly upon popular influence.
4. The state demands that one live in the moment.

C. *Portrait of the philosophers.*

1. Stale. Excessive thinking is ineffectual (Kleist)
2. They discover the point where the scholar begins.
3. The priestly squabble.
4. Primitive times.
5. Lack of any models of ethical greatness.
6. The conflict between lie and thought is suffered everywhere.
7. Defective logic.
8. The absurd education of university students.
9. The life and genesis of philosophers.

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[67]Cf. Nietzsche's remarks on modern houses in *UBc*, 1 and on the "architecture for knowing" in *FW*, 280.

D. *Can philosophy serve as the foundation of a culture*? Yes, but now no longer: it is much too refined and sharpened. One can no longer rely upon it. In fact philosophy has permitted itself to be drawn into the current of modern education. It in no way controls this education. In the best cases, philosophy has become science (Trendelenburg). Portrait of Schopenhauer: the contrast between his eudaimonean practice (the worldly wisdom of an overripe age, like that of the Spaniards) and his recently noticed, more profound philosophy. He condemns the present from two sides. Meanwhile I see no other possibility than to adopt Schopenhauer's worldly wisdom for practical matters, and for deeper needs to adopt [the more profound] wisdom. Whoever does not want to live in this contradiction must fight for an improved *physis*[68] (culture).

[68]*Physis* is the Greek word for "nature." It is often used in German with the sense of "natural constitution," "physiology," or "physique." Nietzsche's definition of culture as an "improved" or "transfigured" *physis* reoccurs in both *UBb,* 10 and *UBc,* 3. This definition is of fundamental importance, both for an understanding of Nietzsche's theory of culture (it must be based in nature) and of man (he is the being whose nature it is to "cultivate" or "improve" his own nature). What this cultivation amounts to is, in part anyway, the *unification* of the personality. Therefore the definition of culture as "improved *physis*" is closely related to culture as the "unifying mastery" of the drives (*P,* 46). (It is noteworthy that Nietzsche is indebted to Goethe for the idea behind *both* of these definitions. See *PtZG,* 1.)